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"It is not the intention of the Allies to
destroy or enslave the German people. It is the
intention of the Allies that the German people
he given the opportunity to prepare for the
eventual reconstruction of their life on a
democratic and peaceful basis. If their own
efforts are steadily directed to this end, it
will he possible for them in due course to take
their pla.ce among tne free and peaceful peoples
of the world."
Potsdam Declaration
August 2
,
1945
..
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1The German problem of today is resolved into two phases:
The first dealing with the attitudes of the German peoples;
the second dealing with the conflict among the allies over
Germany
•
During the closing months of the war, we heard much
talk of denazification and reeducation. However, few Ameri-
cans had any well thought out plan for its accomplishment
.
Perhaps the statement of General Patton, head of the Military
Government in Bavaria, best illustrates American lack of
understanding. Said Patton "this Nazi thing is just like a
i
Republican-Democratic election fight. rt It seems incredible
that so important a man could compare nazism to an American
election battle, hut like Patton, many thought of nazism as
another political party. They failed to see the ideological
fanaticism involved. Certainly with these sentiments little
hope for eradicating nazism could be held.
furthermore, American thought seemed to lie at two
extremes. One group pictured the Germans as a mislead people
under the control of a few Nazi demagogues. The second
group saw the Germans as all bad, a people who should be
punished severely for war crimes, atrocities and cruelty.
The truth probably lies somewhere cetween the two . But our
problem is not to condemn a race as good or bad but to under-
stand why such an ideology was acceptable to them in order to
Hill, R. Struggle Por Germany
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prevent such trends in the future.
The Democratic party of the Weimar Republic lost its
most forceful leader, Walther Rathenau, in 1922 and the
only other liberal party, the Peoples' Party^ was similarly
affected in 1929 with the death of Gustav Stresemann. The
years of depression and the shame of the Versailles Treaty
were political fodder for the National Socialist party of
Adolf Hitler. He held out relief for each economic class of
Germany. His greatest asset lay in his appeal to tne German
middle classes. He offered the small shopkeepers relief from
the control of big business which he claimed was under Jewish
domination. He then let the industrialists believe that his
promises to these people were merely to pacify them and in
turn assured the industrialist of ’’relief from industrial
2
strife througn suppression of the labor union." To the
ancient Junker class he promised that there would be no land
reform and to the eastern peasant he held out the hope of an
end to the old estate system.
We may well ask why the Germans followed such a man in
the intervening years between 1953 and 1945. Perhaps the
most important factor was lack of any effective opposition.
People must have a leader to follow and there was no such
man for the Germans to turn to. Of course, it cannot be
proven that if such a man had existed, that the Germans would
follow him. Hitler was winning concessions from the allied
2. ibid pg. 55
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powers. His refusal to i gree any longer to armament limitation
and his entry into the league in spite of this decision,
aroused in the German people a pride for their leader. This
is not unnatural. We may not li^e our leaders, hut if they
follow a policy whicn enhances our national prestiege, we look
upon their actions with pride. So it was with many Germans.
They could once again say proudly, "I am a German.” The dreams
of Bismarck and the Kaiser did not seem so impossible after
all, for under Hitler, Germany might yet win her place in the
sun.
Even when the war was going badly, the Germans had no
feeling of guilt. It was simply the feeling that their
planning had not been adequate and so they must renounce
nazism in favor of the policies of their ’‘liberators'* ( As the
Allies were often called.) There was no other way open for
them. But if Nazism had been successful, their loyalty would
not have lessened, borne Germans, of course, disapproved of
Nazi policies, but when their country went to war, they fought
not as Nazis but as Germans. "My country right or wrong”
still holds with any nationalistic country. The question then
is how are we to treat these Germans who have no sense of
guilt, only a sense of defeat?
Any answer must first rest on an economic solution for
Germany. Without a stable economy, Germany cannot survive.
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Left in economic chaos, Germany would easily "become the prey
of the first "ism" which could offer her hope of something
better. It is only if democracy can offer food, and security
that we can hope to win Germany to us. After economic security
has been realized we may hope to implant the seeds of democ-
racy, but not before.
Any paper on Germany would be incomplete without mention
of the increasing conflict of the allies over what must be
done in Germany. The allies realized that they must prevent
any future German agression. They also realized that they
must prevent Germany from being used by one Allied group
against the other. The last statement has been the most im-
portant in Allied considera.tion . Germany, as the geographical
and economic heart of Europe, is a most important strategic
gate where two economies and two ideologies meet. The
present struggle is not over control of a single zone but over
control of all Germany. There has been a temporary boundary
drawn by* zonal system but whether this remains permanent is
yet to be seen.
There has been a great dead, of mistrust on both our side
and the Russian side. Russia hen only to look bactC to the
years following World War I when the United States sent troops
to fight for the Tsar. She can easily remember that we failed
to recognize the present government until 19b3. And it takes
no stretch of the imagination to see tnat our recent extension
of friendship was due to the war.
{
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,
on the other hand, cannot help hut he suspicious of
a nation whose ideology is based on Ilegel ajnd Marx, two men
who advocated a theory totally opnosed to any we might hold.
We have only to go over Russia’s most recent actions such as
her putch into Czechoslovakia
,
her treaty with Finland, and
her constant pressure for control of the Dardanelles, to
realize that Germany is only another testing ground in the
bet tie between East end West.
On this basis it becomes imperative for us that democracy
succeed in Germany, and ’’if democracy cannot bring forth any-
thing better than hunger, unemployment, industrial stagnation
3
and economic disruption, it cannot be sold to the Germans.”'"
The object of this thesis is therefore, to show what
has been done, within the American Zone and within Bizonia,
to establish the kind of government and economic stability
under which democracy can best succeed. In order to give a
clear presentation of my material I have divided the thesis
into two parts; one on the political aspects; the second on
the economic aspects. Under these two divisions, I have tried
to revi ew briefly what the allies have done and then I have
taken it from the international sphere to the local level to
discuss what America has done in Germany.
3. ibid. pg. 98
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PART I
THE POLITICAL ASPECTS

CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF OUR POLICY
When the United States entered the second World War on
December 8, 1941, it was with the realization that each of
the agressor countries would have to be completely defeated.
This, of course, would bring an end to the totalitarian system
established in Germany, and the allies would find it necessary
to set up a government to carry out regulatory functions. Our
purposes reached a higher plane than merely providing a means
of control. It was hoped that each of the defeated nations
could be educated to a peaceful and democratic form of govern-
ment. To meet this need, the Military Government of the Office
of the Provost Marshal General was established in early 1942.
Its task was to work out a suitable plan of training men to
occupy and govern the vanquished nations. However, the Divisio
was not equipped to represent the War Department on matters
of common policy. For this purpose the Civil Affairs Division
was instituted. Its functions were "primarily to inform and
advise the Secretary of War in regard to all matters within
the purview of the War Department." 1
Under the guidance of these two offices, men were trained
for Military Government. The first training school was organ-
ized at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. It
provided for a three month instruction period during which a
n
1. Holborn, H.
,
American Military Government Pg. 8

2planned program of areal orientation would be given. It
included a history of the culture, former political insti-
tutions and a study of the language of the country which
the men would occupy. It was soon realized that one school
could not nope to train a. sufficient number of men for the
long task ahead and additional schools were created at Port
Custer, Michigan and at various American Universities.
Credit is due to those teaching such courses for they
were handicapped by not being informed as to what the Ameri-
can policies of occupation would be. There was conflict
over which department should formulate overall plans and
early attempts to organize agencies failed. At last the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was created. Combining
these three departments helped considerably although in trie
early years it did not function as efficiently as could nave
been desired. News of up-to-date conditions in Germany were
hard to obtain. Because of these factors, instructors could
only give an incomplete picture of the work that lay ahead.
Each school varied in its courses. Men at Port Custer
were put under strict military discipline and were forced to
take physical training similar to that given to the infantry.
It was ridiculous to give such a rigid training to men who
had come to these schools from professional occupations and
who would find no need for it in military government.
At first it was thought that by new methods, men could
..
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3learn to speak German within three months. Such optimism
was unfounded. ?ew gained more than an elementary back-
ground. Even now the majority of the occupying officers
do not know more than a very limited amount of German.
After spending ninety days in a school of Military
Government, the men were sent to England to await the in-
vasion of Germany. When the invasion got under way, they
were to follow the troops end as each city or town was en-
tered, would take over the government. The period of waiting
was most demoralizing for these men who had, for the most
part, led very active civilian lives. In addition, they
were subjected to more training which turned out to be no
different from the courses studied in the United States.
After having seen the same slides on military occupation,
and after having studied the same material tv/o or tnree
times, the men became apathetic to the whole system.
It must be recognized that the importance of winning
the war was the first consideration of almost all govern-
ment agencies and little time or thought could De given to
long range programs. Also, this was the first real attempt
at military government. In the first occupied areas , plans
which seemed promising at first failed, and it was necessary
to make new plans. In view of these facts, many allowances
must be made for what often resulted in confusion.
..
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4CHAPTER II
A. BIPARTITE PLANNING
Prom June 1943 until June 1945, the British and Am-
ericans worked in close cooperation on plans for governing
Germany. A Combined Civil Affairs Committee was set up
under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Policies, developed by
the Civil Affairs Division were brougnt before the Committee
and discussed and decided upon. Perhaps the most important
office operating under the CCAC was the German Country Unit
which worked for many months gathering material on Germany
and analyzing problems of occupation. The result of this
research was the ’’Handbook for Military Government in Germany”
which provided up-to-date data on Germany and served as a
constant reference for the military officers.
B. TRIPARTITE PLANNING
The first real move of the three ma.jor powers to work
together on German occupation was begun at the Moscow Con-
ference in November 1943. A European Advisory Committee was
created; composed of the American and Russian ambassadors in
London (Mr. Winant and Mr. Gusev) and Sir William Strange of
the British Poreign Office. The Committee was authorized to
deal with non-military problems in an advisory capacity.
Broad statements of policy were worked out in more intricate
detail and submitted to the Big Three for approval. Por ex-
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5ample, after the UK, USSR, and the US had decider at Teheran
to create a zonal system of occupation for Germany, it was the
EAC which determined the Russian zonal boundaries. (The
Committee was, however, unable to determine the American and
British zones. In its discussions it suggested tnat the two
western powers might combine and work together in a single
zone, but the United States did not favor such a partition.
It was maintained that differences of opinion were bound to
arise over vital questions, which for the rehabilitation of
Germany ought to be settled immediately. The final division
was therefore left until the Quebec Conference of August 1944.
The EAC also decided on the document of German surrender
which was set fortn on June 5, 1945. It provided, among
other things, for complete supremacy of the three major powers
for total disarmament and demilitarization, for political,
economic, and administrative and financial control. The
occupying powers would be supreme each in his own zone and
would act jointly on matters affecting Germany as a whole.
The most important achievement of the European Advisory
Commission was the construction of the Allied Control Council,
accepted in May 1944. The Control Council is composed of tne
four Allied Commanders -in-Chief who act an the highest au-
thority in place of a central German government. It meets
three times monthly and considers problems which have been

6suggested by the Staff and Coordinating Committees. "De-
cisions reached "by the Control Council must "be unanimous
since it was f^lt that if Germany were to "be treated as a
unit, complete accord of the four powers would "be necessary.
A Coordinating Committeeworks under the Control Council to
advise and carry out the latter's decisions. Four Deputy
Commanders, representing the US, UK, USSR, and France maice
up this committee. Also under the Control Council is the
Countrol Staff made up of the following twelve divisions:
(1) Military, ( 2 ) Finance, (5) Reparations, (4) Legal,
(5) Naval, (6) Air, (7) Transport, (8) Political (S) Economic,
(10) Manpower, (11 ) Prisoners of far and Displaced Persons,
(12) Internal Affairs and Communications. Each of the four
powers are equally represented in the twelve offices. It
was furthermore determined that any organization set up "by
the United Nations for work in Germany wo uld be subservient
to the commands of the Allied Control Council. This of
course limits the power of the UN, although it must be
recognized that the same nations are in control of both
groups
.
The Yalta Agreement was concluded on February 11, 1945.
It reiterated the agreed plans on a zonal system for Ger-
many. France was to be invited to take a zone of occupation
and upon accepting their offer, the zonal boundaries were
..
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to be determined by the SAC* Plans for control of German
military potential were stated as follows:
” It is our inflexible purpose to destroy
German militarism and Nazism and to ensure that
Germany will never again be able to disturb the
peace of the world. We are determined to disarm
and disband all German armed forces; break up for
all times the German Genera,! Staff that has re-
peatedly contrived the resurgence of German milit-
arism; remove or destroy all the German military
equipment; eliminate or control all German in-
dustry that could be used for military production;
bring all war criminals to justice and swift
punishment and exact reparation in hind for the
destruction wrougnt by Germans; wipe out the Nazi
Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions;
remove all Nazi and militarist influences from
public offices and from the cultural and economic
life of the German people; and take in harmony
such other measures in Germany as may be necessary
to the future peace and safety of the world.” ^
The conclusions reached at Yalta were stated in the
document of surrender. Thus, the German Hign Command cannot
again use the excuse that Germany has been deceived and
tricked bv the terms of the surrender.
Yalta provided the background for the Potsdami Declaration
of August 2, 1945. At Potsdam, the United States, Great
Britain and the Soviet Union worked out, among other things,
the political policies for German occupation. Once again it
was stated that the powers would act jointly in matters
affecting Germany as a whole and that each would be sovereign
2. Pollock and Meisel, Germany Under Occupation Yalta Agree-
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8in his own zone. The German population was to he treated
uniformly as far as was practicable.
The purposes of the Control Council were to he guided
hy, “ The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany
and elimination or control of all German industry that could
*>
he used for military production.”
The German peoples were to he made aware of the fa,ct
that they had suffered total military defeat and that they
“cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought
upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and
fanatical ITazi resistance have destroyed German economy
and made chaos and suffering inevitable.” ^
It further stated that the judicial system should he
completely “reorganized in accordance with the principles
of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for
all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or
religion
.
Administration of affairs should he directed
towards the decentralization of the olitical structure
and the development of local responsibility.” To
accomplish this, democratic parties were to he encouraged,
local self-government restored and representative and e-
lective principles introduced as rapidly as possible.
With this background of general political policies,
7
^bid ^he Potsdam declaration ^ . 15
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I think Yvre may now turn to the American zone to see what
has been accomplished there since May 1945.

10
CHAPTER III
THE AMERICAN ZONE
The American zone is the largest of the four divisions
of Germany. It includes an area of about 42,000 square miles
with a population of slightly more than 17,000,000 or 405
people per squire mile.
There are three states or Land within the American zone;
Bavaria, Hesse and ’Vuerttemberg-Ba den . Bavaria is the
largest of the three Land. It is 27,700 square miles and has
a population of 8,933,000 which is twenty-eight per cent more
than in 1939. Most of Bavaria is a plateau which rises about
1,600 feet above sea level. This plateau is almost com-
pletely surrounded by mountains. To the so th are the famous
Bavarian Alps which bring many tourists to Bavaria each year.
This tourist trade was an important source of income in pre-
war years for Bavaria has little industry. It has an almost
negligible amount of coal and iron. Its chief crops are
wheat, barley, rye, oats, and potatoes. Hesse embraces most
of the former Prussian province of Hesse-Nassau and eastern
Land Hesse. It has an area of 8,221 square miles and a pop-
ula.tion of 4,050,000. This is an increase of about one-ha.lf
million since 1939. Harming and mining are the two principle
occupations. Wuerttemberg-Baden ha.s an area of 5,900 square
miles and a population of 3,650,000 which is an increase of
380,000 since 1939. It is the region of the high plains and

11
mountains of the Black Forest. There is a great deal of
farming in Wuerttemberg-Baden
. Baden also contains such
minerals as coal, iron, zinc, nickel and copper. Wuerttemherg
was formerly the book-publishing center of Germany but since
the war this industry has not regained its former strength
due to the shortage of pulp for paper manufacture.
A period of political inactivity followed the German
surrender. The void was due in part to American reluctance
to enforce a completely authoritarian rule over the German
peoples and in part to the lack of political initiative of
the Germans. Doubtlessly more would have been accomplished if
the American Government had seen fit to construct a. puppet
German Government, but such a government would have had little
semblance of democracy. It seems better to allow the need for
political activity to become obvious so that the people them-
selves will feel the need to take things into their own hands.
Throughout the early period of occupation there was much
criticism over our seeming lack of policy. It was pointed
out that Russia, had pro ceded more quickly in establishing
order out of the confusion of war. Her policies were efficient
and well-planned. Her main objective at that time was to
strip eastern Germany of big industry and let the Germans pay
for the war. This, while harsh, gave the German people a
knowledge of what they had to face and they became resigned to
it. In the American zone, the people didn't know what to
., <
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expect. Regulation varied in the several districts; some
harsh, some hind, and some 'with no policy at all.
It seems improbable that what happened in the early
months could ha.ve been avoided. Democracies are often ham-
pered by many factions and the result is often obstruction
of major plans. But if we believe in submitting to the will
of the majority, we must be prepared to move slowly on even
vital questions. If we believe that democracy is the best
form of government, we must be patient at its sometimes
apparent confusion.
Gradually out of the cnaos came a more stable solution.
The Germans were to be taught democracy by the "grass roots"
plan; that is, to learn through cooperation in local affairs
such as trade unions, cooperatives, church organize tions and
schools, and after progress in these fields, to go on to
municipal, rural and la.rger city council administration.
To carry out this plan, three offices operate in the
American zone. USFET (United States Forces European Theater)
decides issues relating to disarmament, demilitarization,
security, displaced persons and non-civil control matters.
OMGUS (Office of Military Government United States) super-
vises all internal affairs and operates through German ad-
ministrative agencies and personnel. The SWHCC (State, War
Uavy Coordinating Committee) judges questions involving
security*
..
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Political Parties and Elections
Under the surveillance of tnese three divisions, German
political parties have started to operate. Before entering an
active field, the parties were carefully screened for Nazi
tendencies. When this was done, four major pa.rties and sever-
al minor parties were given permission to organize. There is
not time to discuss all the parties formed, hut it is necessary
to understand the platforms of the four leading groups.
One of the more conservative of these is the CDU (Chris-
tian Democratic Union) or the CSU (Christian Social Union) as
it is called in Bavaria. It is quite similar to trie old Cen-
ter Party and Bavarian Peoples’ Party of the Weimar Republic,
drawing members from business, clerical, peasant and moderate
labor groups. During its former existence it was almost ex-
clusively Catholic but today it has disclaimed its sectarian
basis and has a small conservative Protestant following. To
satisfy such a heterogeneous group, it adheres to a middle of
the roa.d policy and its platform often varies regionally to
adapt itself to right wing or left wing elements. Its program
stresses German revival on the oasis of Christianity, morality
and individual liberty. Although it wishes to preserve the
present social order, it would accept liberal reform and mod-
erate socialization of economic life. Like the other tnree
major parties, it stands for German unity but prefers a, fed-
.«
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eral government based on "a purposeful synthesis of states
rights and national authority." ® In its earliest stages the
older leaders of the pre-Nazi regime were most influencial.
They gained control especially in Bavaria where Pnednch
Schaeffer, an ex-creme conservative, became Minister-President.
He was supported in ti-is position by Colonel Charles E. Keegan,
commander of the American Military Government. Schaeffer
formed a cabinet of his political friends and associates,
claiming that since he was responsible to the Military Govern-
ment, it was his right to select men whom he could trust. The
younger and more progressive members of the party refused to
follow him and organized themselves under Hr. Josef Mueller,
a Munich attorney, and under members of the clergy. They ad-
vocc ted a far reaching reform program which included many
socialistic ideas. Schaeffer, in spite of the threat of a
party creek- up, refused to broaden his platform. He felt that
he was supported by the Military Government and that his po-
sition was secure. His lack of understanding led to an alli-
ance of the left CDU, the Social Democrats and the Communists
who agreed to a coalition government under Mueller. However,
they were powerless to force any decision on Schaeffer since
all appointments were made by the Military Government. But,
as inevitably happens, complaints a,gainst Schaeffer and the
6. Occupation of Germany; Polic: and Progress Dept, of St? te
Publ . 2783 pg. 54
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Military Government’s actions found their way to the American
pro e
.
The situ* bion . Drought to General Eisenhower *s
attention and Schc ff ’was dismissed.
This event should have led to the selection of Mueller,
hut the American authorities did not know of the political
agreement among the three parties and they chose Wilhelm
Hoegner, a. Social Democrat and the only well known Bavarian
liberal. Hoegner should have refused but he wanted the
prestige and power and so contrary to the agreement, accepted
the position. This brought about the end of the coalition.
Mueller refused to participate in the government and gave his
time to strengthening his political position. Schaeffer was
finally forced to acknowledge him as chairman of the party.
In 1946 it was discovered tnat Schaeffer had pro-lTazi tenden-
cies and he was forbidden to vote, or to have any political
affiliation. This of course brought an end to his political
career
.
Mueller has also lost ground in Bavarian circles because
of his rejection of the Separatist majority within his party.
Although this enhanced his power in other sectors where
Bavarian separatism is frowned upon, it cost him the Minister
Presidency of Bavaria when the CDU won the elections of De-
cember 1346 for his party deserted him and chose Dr. Hans
Shard
,
a rightist member of the CDU* Shard’s first cabinet
was a coalition cabinet but it has since changed to a one-
,•
,
.
16
party cabinet a.nd with tins change Dr. Mueller has uecome
vice-premier. But Mueller's position has become secondary
to Ehard's now, especially in view of the fact that Ehard
has become chairman of the ne\ Bizonial upper house.
The other conservative party is the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) known as the Pree Democrats in Bavaria and the
Democratic Peoples’ Party in Wuerttemberg-Baden . It repre-
sents a. middle class element which before 1933 was closely
associated with the German Social Democrats and the German
Peoples Party. In almost all aret s it is the weakest numeri-
cally of the four groups. Members are recruited from the
intellegentsia, the ousiness fields and the civil service
groups. It stresses individualism, free enterprise, and
property rights. It favors a strongly centralized German
Reich. The LDP has remained secular, avoiding the church
affiliations which stell characterize the Christian party.
Although it is not very popular within the agrarian Catholic
American zone, it has won members in the industrialized. area.s
of the British. In an attempt to give the party greater unity
two chairmen (Dr. Wilhelm Kuelz and Dr. Theodor Keuss) 'were
chosen in March 1947. Their task was to provide a platform
which would appeal to all people within their ranks. The
party's greatest hope for success in a future German govern-
ment rests on the fact that it would be the least objection-
..
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able to the "Big Pour" for the Communists will not support
the SPD which it has forced out of its zone, nor the CDU
which is strongly favored by t.i.e U.S. The Communist party
on the other hand would be unacceptable to the U.S. or Britain.
The only compromise which could be agreed on seems to be the
LPD which the Communists find less obj ectional be than the
other two in spite of its conservative thought.
The SPD (Social Democratic Party) represents the labor
classes of the western zones . Its leadership is in the hands
of the trade union officials. It is decended from the Social
Democratic Party of the Weimar Republic. The pnilosophy of the
SPD is based on a gradual approach to socialism to be achieved
through land reform, nationalization of key industries, coop-
eratives, legislative curbs on capitalistic abuses, and im-
provement of working conditions. To attain these ends on a
national status, they want a united German Government with
sufficient authority to bring about economic and social reforms.
In 1946 the Russian zonal officers forced a merger of
the SPD with the Communist Party. The latter had been unable
to gain a substantial majority in the eastern zone and it was
felt that by joining the two groups, the Communists would
gain the upper hand in spite of public opinion. Gratewohl
,
Pechner and Dahrendorff opposed such a merger but they held
important governmental positions in the Soviet zone and felt
.I
t
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that if they turned down the Russian suggestion they would he
quietly forced out of office. They hoped that by accepting
the merger they would stxll be aole to help former SPD mem-
bers and prevent eastern Germany from oeing governed as a
Russian satellite. The masses, however, disapproved such
action, but there was no other party to take its place. The
Soviet Union would not sanction a. new party to replace the
old since this v/ould defeat their purposes; they could not
join the CDU for it would be against their whold ideology;
the.) could not join the Communist Party of course, since that
party was the basis for their dissatisfaction. With no party
to turn to, it only remained for them to accept the merger.
The west, nowever
,
was under no obligation to join the
Communists and tne result has been a split of the Social
Democratic Party. The merger had been planned for the wnold
country, but I-Ioegner and HI o the of the U.S. zone and Schu-
macher of the Britisn zone refused to send delegates to the
convention held for this purpose. They v.ill not under any
circumstances back the Communist Party.
Schumacher is the recognized head of the SPD in the
western zones. He was a Social Democrat in the days of the
Weimar Republic and, beca-use of his great opposition to Nazism,
spent ten yea.rs in Hitler’s concentration camps. "A dynamic
personality, not in the least handicapped by his physical
..
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disabilities, he proved himself also an arresting, persuasive
7
speaker and a first-rate political strategist." He is
opposed to federalist tendencies for he wants a strong central
government which will nationalize basic industries and oring
about a planned economy.
Schumacher, as head of the strongest political party in
Germany, is regarded by the British and Americans as a
possible president or chancellor of the future fourth Reich.
He is, however, disliked by Russian authorities so his chances
for this high position seem to rest on either a change in
Russian attitude which is unlikely, or on the establishment of
a separate western Germany.
The Communist Party (KPD) resulted from a split in the
Social Democratic Party in the days of the Weimar Republic.
Its policies today are virtually the same as those of the
former pa.rty. Traditionally revolutionary, it seeks to
promote a radical reform program. Its chief strength lies in
the trade unions and shop councils. Although it often col-
ls.borates with other groups to gain power, it still wants a,
classless society represented by one party. It has become
the strongest party in the ea.st Decause of the Russian forced
merger with the S?D, but in the west it has gained very little
power
.
I t^-ink it is here necessary to point out that political
7. Joesten, Joachim, Germany: Wh; t How? pg. 77
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parties mean very little 10 the average German. Ke often
votes to please the American authorities, hoping that with a
favored party in office, the Germans as a group v/ill gain more.
Years of Nazi dictatorship have not given the younger German
the opportunity to develop an interest in self-government.
Election results s how that a, great percentage of the
German people vote. This may at first glance seem to contra,-
dict wha t I have just said, but actua.lly many vote because
they are told to by a higher authority.
The picture is not quite so dismal if we compare the in-
terest snown wnen military government was first established
and the interest of today. Today many Germans are afraid of
Communist rule. Greater demands have been placed on Germans
living in the Russian zone. Slave labor has been taken to
Russia to set up the many dismantled German industries. The
Russian occupation troops have lived off German food. These
policies have caused the Germans to be wary of communism.
Through exercising the duties and tasks which were first
given them, they have come to a better understanding an to
what democracy is all aoout. They have seen the attempts of
the American government to keep corruption and partisan poli-
tics at a. minimum. Today they even ask for more representa-
tion in their government.
-.
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
21
Elections
The U.S. was ahead of the other nations in holding elec-
tions in Germany. The first, to elect local councils (Ge-
meinderat) for communities of less than 20,000, were neld on
January 20 and 27, 1046. Except in a. few small Ba.va.rian
towns, the council then selected the mayor. Rural county
(Landkreis) and larger city (Stadkreis) elections were held
on April 28 and May 26. The ree;ults of these elections showed
a decisive victory for the CDU or CSU in Bavaria and lesser
victories in North Wuerttemberg-Baden
.
In Hesse, which is nearer the British zone and more in-
dustrialized than the southern states and less Catholic, the
SPD gained more votes than any other party. In almost all
areas the KPD and LDP held less tnan ten per cent of the
votes cast. The KPD failed to win a majority in any of the
two hundred and twenty- two districts in the American zone.
In four districts of Hesse, they won the second largest
number of votes, hut in almost all other areas they fell far
behind the two leading parties. The LDP held a majority in
only one district of Hesse although in the north it ran a
close second to the CDU. In the soutn it remains an almost
negative force.
On June 30, constitutional assemblies were elected from
each Land or State. The following table of statistics shows
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the relative power of each major party.
Hesse
SPD
43
CDU or CSU
34
EPD
7
LDP
6
Others
17
Total
90
Wue r 1 1emb erg - Bad e
n
32 41 10 -- -- 100
Bavaria 51 109 8 -- 12 180
Total 126 184 25 6 29 370
The assemblies convened during the summer of 1946 and
drew up state constitutions which were cased on drafts pre-
pared by special committees appointed by each of the three
Minister-Presidents. The ilitary Government, after being
assured that democratic processes, civil rights and supremacy
of the law were safeguarded, gave the assemblies a free hand
in writing the documents. They were then approved by American
Autnorities and submitted to the German people in October 1 Su6
The Constitutions
There is not time here to G-lscuss the Constitutions of
the three states in full. However, certain parts must be
commented upon.
Each sta.te has an elaborate bill of rights ba,sed on
American and British civil rights and on the social rights of
the twentieth century. Ex post facto laws are forbidden;
8
. Constitutions of Bavaria, Hesse and TVuer 1 1 emberg- Baden
Publ . by OMGUS l Feb. 15, 1.47) pg. 3
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there shall be no double jeopardy of person and all are given
equality before the law. Freedom of speech, assembly, press,
movies, co.miunic: tions and religion are granted. These are
rights with which we are all familiar. In the social field
we find such rignts as the right to work, the right to lei-
sure, and the right to vacations. The state guarantees the
common welfare of a.ll and to these ends, state control of cer-
tain industries will be recognized if necessary. Wuerttemberg-
Baden and Hesse i re inclined to be more socialistic than
Bavaria. Bavaria grants only state supervision of production
and distribution out Wuerttemberg-BexLen recognizes the right
to socialize industry if it is for the good of the people and
Hesse has provided for socialization of iron, steel, power,
railways, large banks and insurance companies.
It is interesting to note that there a,re provisions in
each constitution to limit or suspend all civil liberties in
times of danger. The limitations in each constitution are as
follows
:
Bavaria Art. 43 Sec. 1 and 2
"If there is threatening danger to public
security and order, the Cabinet may sus-
pend initially for one week the right of
free public expression of opinion (Art. 110),
freedom of the press (Art. Ill), the secrecy
of posta.l, telephone and telegraph communi-
cations (Art. 112) and freedom of assembly
(Art . 113 )
.
"The Cabinet must simultaneously cause the
t <
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Landtag to be convened, must immediately
inform it of all measures taken, and,
upon demand of the Landtag, must repeal
them in whole or in pa,rt. If the Landtag
with a majority of the lawful members
confirms the measures taken, their
validity is extended another month. 11
Hesse Art. 125
"The Landtag alone may determine that the
constitutional order of the State is in
danger. This decision requires the ap-
proval of at least two -thirds of the legal
number of its members and must be pub-
lished by the President of the Landtag.
The decision may suspend or restrict
freedom of the press
.
The decision becomes void after three
months unless it specifies a shorter
period of validity. It may be repeated
under the same condition."
Wuer ttemberg-Baden Art. 79
"In case of imminent danger to the existence
of the State the Cabinet may partially or
totally suspend for one week the basic
rights of (Art. 2, The rights re-
ferred to are similar to our civil liberties.)
and can issue ordinances which have the force
of law.
The government must inform the Landtag
within 48 hours of all measures taken
according to paragraph one.
It the Landtag approves the measures taken
by a majority of the legal number of its
members, their validity will be extended
for a month. Burther extensions, restricted
in each case to one month, require the
majority necessary f^r amendments to the
Constitution "
9
.
Constitutions of Bavaria, Hesse and 7/uerttemberg-Ba.den
Publ. bv PUG-US Pgs . 14 , 49, 70
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It seems to me that such clauses leave the pa.th open for a
complete withdrawal of civil li Gerties. Who is to be quali-
fied to judge what constitutes dpnger? Today, when we are
faced with so many crises, is it not possible that civil
liberties, sacrificed in the name of danger, may be completely
lost?
Educational opportunities are open for all. Bavaria
again differs from Hesse and 7uer ttemberg- Baden . While the
latter states provide for religious education within the
schools, they do not emphasize one particular religion.
Bavarian schools on the other hand are Catholic unless parents
and otiier responsible persons request Protestant instruction.
This is seen in Art. 135 of the Bavarian Constitution which
states that,
'•Public elementary schools are either confessional
or non- denominational . Parents and other persons
responsible for the education of children are free
to elect the t}pe of school. However, Hon-
denominational schools are to be established
only in places with a population of mixed religious
faiths upon application of parents and other
persons responsible for the education of children."
Thus, freedom of religion is maintained, but it is with a
definite Catholic leaning.
Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden provide for a unicameral
system of government with direct election and proportional
1 0 . Constitutions of Bavaria, Hesse and uerttemberg-Baden
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representation. Bavaria also provides for this, but in add-
ition it has a Senate which serves in an advisory capacity
and represents the social, economic, cultural and municipal
corporations of the state. In each state a certain percentage
of the votes cast must be won by each representative. The
tenure of office for Landtag (house of representatives) mem-
bers is four years, although provision is made for dissolution
before the term of office ends. A Minister-President is e-
lected by each Landtag and he in turn appoints the members of
his cabinet subject to Landtag approval. Each cabinet min-
ister must carry out the general policies laid down by the
Minister-President. Within tnis limitation, he act independ-
ently and is himself responsible to the Landtag.
In Bavaria, bills may be introduced by the Minister-
President, the Landtag
,
the Seante or the people; in
Wuerttemberg- Baden by the Cabinet or the Landtag; in Eesse by
the Landtag or the people. In the three states provisions
are made for popular referende on all measures except the
state budget.
The constitutions also provide for amendments and
plebiscites, which give the people a direct method of approving
controversial legislation.
A supreme court has been established in each of the
three states with powers very similar to those of our own
,.
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Supreme Court. The most obvious duplication is found in the
power to review and judge the constitutionality of laws passed
However, unlihe the united States Supreme Court, the state
supreme courts do not have to wail until a case is presented
before they can offer an opinion. They may condemn a law as
unconstitutional at any time.
Recognition of international law has been included in
the three constitutions. This is a fairly new innovation.
Of course, it remains to be seen if such recognition would
carry weight in an international crisis, but it does seem
to be a step in the right direction. In the future there
could be no questions over such actions as the war trials.
Lastly, Wuerttemberg-Baden and Hesse announced that they
wall be members of a future German republic and that federal
law will overrule state law. Bavaria does not go as far as
this, although it states that it will join a future demo-
cratic German state which rests on the voluntary union of the
several states.
Civil Service
The Civil Service Codes in the three Laender are approxi-
mately the same. Positions are awarded on a merit basis.
Employees are given the opportunity to present grievances to
higher authorities and to receive impartial consideration.
They cannot engage in political activities beyond the right to
..
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belong to a political party, to express an opinion as a cit-
izen and to vote. It is assumed that eighty per cent of all
government employees will soon he working within the German
Civil Service. This is a high percentage when we consider
that under the Nazi regime only twenty per cent of all govern-
ment employees worked under the civil service.
The Laenderrat
The initial purpose of the Laenderrat was “to deal with
matters affecting more than one state; to facilitate
communications between the states; to coordinate the political,
economic, and social development of the states; and to regu-
late official transactions between the various zones of
occupation." ^ The Minister-Presidents of the three Land : .
meet montnly at Stuttgart to advise and implement OMGUS
policies. Their decisions must be unanimous. They are
assisted by a. secretariat, standing and special committees,
and a directorate which can make decisions by majority vote
on matters which are not of major importance.
Until the new Bizonia government began to operate on
February 17, 1948, it was the last step in building toward
a German Federation. Now, however, the new government,
although it is not officially a political body, has assumed
the proportions of a West German Federation. More will be
11. Joesten, Joachim, Germany: What Mow? pg. 15
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said of tnis "body in the second part of this thesis since the
British-American merger is still officially regarded as an
economic unification.
*
PART II
ECCHorr ASPEG TS
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CHAPTER IV
ALLIED OCCUPATION 1945-1947
May 8, 1945 "brought economic chaos to Germany. Trans-
portation, industry and municipal services were completely
disrupted; food was scarce; water facilities were cut off.
The tremendous task of rebuilding Germany lay at the feet
of the Allied Authorities.
Several plans had been drawn up for the treatment of
Germany economy. The first was the Morgenthau Plan which
was presented by President Roosevelt at the Quebec Conference
in 1944. This plan recommended that Germany be split into
a North and South Federation and tnat the Ruhr and Rhineland
be internationalized. Germany was to be converted into an
agrarian society witn only necessary light industry. This
plan, which had already caused many conflicting view within
the State Department, was soon recognized to be impossible.
To reduce German industry to domestic needs was to
deny subsistence to the rest of Europe for all Europe depends
upon industrial Germany. It is their life line. Furthermore,
to split Germany into three separate areas seemed to take
away all possibility of German self-sufficiency. Each
section depends on another for food, raw materials, or
finished products.
The Potsdam Agreement of August 1945 sought to find
another solution for Germany. By the terms of this agreement,

3k
Germany was to be treated as an economic unit. All German
war potential was to be destroyed and/or dismantled. Repara-
tions were to be paid in kind and to this end, the dismantled
plants were to be shipped to countries which were entitled to
reparations. The U.S.S.R. claims were to be met by removals
from the Russian Zone and from twenty-five per cent of the
dismantled industries of the Western Zones. Other nations
would receive their shares from the Y/estern Zones and from
German external assets. The German standard of living was to
be increased if the proceeds of German exports could pay for
the necessary imports. At no time however, was the German
standard of living to be higher than that of any adjacent
c ountry
.
By November 1945, part of the Potsdam Agreement had
been carried out. The International Allied Reparations
Agency was created at Paris. This eighteen nation conference
was able to reach agreement on their respective shares. Tne
conference was guided oy the principles set down at Yalta in
February 1945 "That reparation from Germany should be
received in the first instance by those countries which have
borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest
losses, and have organized vie tori'- over the enemy."
Reparations were divided into two classifications. A)
"All reparation assets except industrial and other capital
11. The Distribution of Reparation from Germany Dept, of State
Publ . 25S<±
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equipment removed, from Germany a nd merchant ships and. inland
water transport.'* ^ B) The exceptions listed under category
A. The snares for ea.cn of the eighteen countries were as
follows: 13
Percentage share
Country Category A Category B
Albania .05 .35
U.S.A. 28.00 11 .80
Australia .70 .95
Belgium 2.70 4 .50
Canada 3.50 1.50
Denmark .25 .35
Egypt .05 .20
Prance 16.00 ^2.80
United Kingdom 26.00 27.80
Greece 2.70 4.35
India 2.00 2.90
Luxembourg .15 .40
Norway 1.30 1.90
New Zealand .40 . 60
Ne therlends 3.90 5.60
Czechoslovakia 3.00 4.30
Union of South Africa .70 .10
Yugoslavia 6.60 9.60
100.00 100.00
Certain principles were laid down to determine allocation
to the separate countries. Each. nation may use the industries
only within its own territory
.
If a nation has a large pre-
war share in an industry it may request that particular in-
dus try
.
Russia and Poland were not included in the Paris Con-
ference, hut Russia as the most devastated country was to get
the most in reparations. By the Potsdam agreement Russia was
12. Ihid pg. 3
13. Ihid pg. 4
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entitled to twenty-five per cent of the dismantled plants
from the western zones, and she, in return, would pay for
fifteen per cent of these with food and other imports from
> her zone. The remainder of Russian reparations plus the
total amount of Polish reparations were to come from the
eastern zone.
At every foreign conference since Potsdam, Russia has
demanded that she receive reparations equalling ten "billion
dollars. The U.S. and Great Britain have refused this sum
on the grounds that the German economy could not possibly
hope to pay such an amount. It would mean economic distress
in Germany with the result that the U.S. and the U.K. would
ha.ve to pour in more of their dollars to make up the sum
which Russia would drain from their zones. In spite of this
Russia began dismantling many of the industries within her
own zone, at the same time demanding that we start the pay-
ments from the western zones. It was like killing the goose
that laid the golden egg, for the only result would be a
ruined economy which could not produce goods for Russia, in
the future. Russia finally realized this in May 1946, and
she reversed her former policies and began a production drive.
This drive was not to help the Germans; instead it was ma.de
known that seventy-five per cent of the over-all industrial
output would go toward reparation payment.
,*
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In the meantime trouble had arisen in the Allied Control
Council over the fact that Russia was not living up to her
Potsdam promises. She had consistently refused to treat
Germany as an economic unit. The U.S. and Grea.t Sri tain,
on the other nand, were anxious to establish a coordinated
export- import program in order to lower their own expendi-
tures within their zones. The U.S. was spending over
200,000,000 dollars a year in the American zone and the
British were spending 3^0,000,000 dollars in theirs. Neither
country could see any advantage in dismantling more in-
dustries for Russia, when the only result would he an in-
creased burden on the American and British taxpayer. Since
no agreement could be reached. General Clay finally ordered
the suspension of all reparation to Russia. On May 25, 1946,
he explained '’that if the United States zone was to become
a separate self-supporting unit, contrary to the Potsdam
Agreement, he did not wish to jeopardize its productive
capacity any further by carrying through the reparations
„
14program. rt
Since the Moscow Congerence of March 17, 1947, repara-
tions ha.ve remained in a deadlock. The U.S. has shipped
German industrial plants to those countries which were
represented at the Paris Conference, but shipments to Russia,
ha ve almost completely stopped. It is felt that those
14. Joes ten , Joachim, Germany: What Now? pgs. 218,219
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countries now receiving reparations will aid economic re-
covery in Europe. This in turn would reduce American aid to
Europe. Furthermore, ’'any change in American policy would
put it in sole opposition to the other seventeen members of
the Paris Reparations group and tnus seem to assure long
15drawn-out wrangling among victorious allies." ° This is
the reparations picture as it rests today. The failure of
tne Big Four to come to any agreement is of major importance,
for it has prevented any discussion of a German peace treaty*
This split widened the breach between East and West to a
point where Germany was no longer looked upon as a single
uni t
.
1945 was a, year of hopefulness however. Reparations
problems were regarded as successful. Furthermore, the
allies were able to cooperate in other fields. The Economic
Directorate which worked under the Coordinating Committee
and the Control Council was es taolisned . It consisted of
seven committees ; food and agriculture, industry, central
German admini street ion
,
trade and commerce, I.G. Farben
Control, fuel, liquidation of German war potential. Dele-
gates Konstantine Koval, U.S.S.R.; Eric Seal, Britain;
Rene Sergent, France; and General William Draper, U.S.A.
served on the Directorate which has met about once a week
15. Christian Science Monitor Feb. 9, 1948
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since then, but has oeen unable to accomplish mucn in the way
of treating Germany as an economic unit.
Thus 1946 came to a close with this start for German
economy. It was a definite start and the Allies could look
forward to more action in 1946 for the necessary groundwork
had been laid. It seemed as though their hopes were not to
be ill-founded for on March 26, a Level of Industry Plan, in
accordance with the Potsdam Agreement was decided upon. Only
thirty per cent of German industry had oeen destroyed in the
war. This left a high war potential which the Allies would
nave to diminish if Germany were to become a peaceful nation,
however, it was also necessary that the Allies leave a
sufficient industrial capacity to insure a self-supporting
country.
The final plan rested on four major assumptions:
"l) That Germany would, for the Present, consist
of the territory between the Oder-ITeisse and the
western boundaries of the Prench and British zones.
2) That the population by 1949 would not be more
than 66,500,000.
3) Exports would not be discriminated against
in foreign markets.
4) That Germany would be treated as an economic
unit." 16
Chart I in tne appendix illustrates those industries
which were prohibited in Germany, those which were restricted
to a. certain capacity and output, and those which were un-
16. A Year of Potsdam Eco. Div. OMGUS pg. 26
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restricted and could be completely developed. This plan was
to reduce the level of industry to fifty or fifty-five per
cent of the 1938 level.
Imports and exports were also estimated in this agree-
ment. Imports would equal thirty per cent of the 1936 im-
ports and exports would equal thirty- eight per cent of those
in 1936. Listed under exports were machinery, electrical
equipment, optics, precision instruments and non-ferrous
metal goods, these equaling thirty-seven percent of the 1935
output and chemical products equaling forty-two per cent of
the 1936 output.
The greatest problem arising during discussions on the
plan was over steel production. Britain argued that too low
a level of steel production would paralyze economy within
their zone. The British were also worried about the fact
that before the war Germany had been their best customer on
the continent and they d-d not wish to create a German
economy which could not afford to irrroor t British goods.
The final decision was an unsa tisfac tory compromise.
The production capacity for steel was not to reach more than
7,500,000 ingot tons of which the actual output was not to
be more than 5,800,000 ingot tons unless the Allied Control
Council gave its consent.
The British d^-d not give up hope of having these figures
».
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changed, and as time passed they won more supporters to their
views. Surprisingly enough it was Russia, formerly against
any increase, who asked for a. revisal of the quotas on steel.
At the Moscow Conference in 1947 she asked that steel capa-
city be raised from the 1946 figure to at least 10,000,000
ingot tons. America and France still opposed this idea, but
two months later America followed in demanding a higher steel
capacity. The London Conference of August 22-27, 1947 worked
out a compromise on steel production for the west. The level
of steel was raised to equal the 1936 standard and in return
the French gained a larger share in the coal and coke output
of the Ruhr.
"It has been determined that in order to support the
revised level of ind stry in the bi-zonal area and to permit
that area to become self-supporting, the limit of annual
steel production m the bi-zonal area shall be fixed a.t
10,700,000 ingot tons per annum and sufficient capacity to
1 7produce that tonnage shall be retained."
,
The London Conference by this decision violated the
Potsdam agreement for Russia had not even been asked to
participate in the discussions held there. By refusing to
treat Germany as an economic unit and by taking it into their
own hands to revise the Level of Industry plan, the Allies
17. Joes ten, Joachim, Germany: What Row? pgs . 1 75^ 1 ?J5
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of the west antagonized an already irritated Russia and when
Russia protested, there was little they could say to defend
themselves and so they remained silent.
The last attempt at concerted action among the Big Four
was the London Conference of last December. Again the Russian
representatives renewed their claims for 10,000,000,000 dollars
in reparations. They refused to attempt to come to an agree-
ment on a peace treaty for Germany until this was settled.
The result was the complete breakdown of the conference. Since
then no attempt has been made to work in harmony on a future
German national government or on economic policies among the
four zones. Potsdam opened the way for cooperation, but none
of the four powers have lived up to the promises made there,
and little by little each has broken away until today all
semblance of unity seems to have vanished.
,.
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CHAPTER V
THE AMERICAN ZONE
During this time the American Zone was faced with its
own particular problems. The U.S. olicy was to hel the
Germans help themselves by raising German agricultural
nroduetion to a maximum, by importing sufficient food, thus
enabling the factory worker to increase his daily output,
and by exporting as much as >ossioie.
The American Zone is a deficit region. It has been said
that in dividing the zones, Russia got the food supplies,
Britain the industry, Er&nce the wine, and America the scenery.
While this is not altogether true, it is true that the United
States has received the poorest economic zone. It has been
and still is an area for converting raw materials Into fin-
ished products. Because of this, it is very dependent upon
the rest of Germany for food supplies and raw materials. As
long as Germany is not tr c- i d a! • a economic unit, the t
of making the American Zone self-sufficient will be a diffi-
cult one
.
In pre-war days the food problem was always present.
Ninety-one per cent of its 900,000 farms were less than forty-
nine acres. Farmers produced crops of high money value,, nut
of low caloric value. Today the area under cultivation has
declined about thirteen per cent. This may not seem to be a
great loss but when considered with the problem of poor soil
J j >fl
.
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and population increase it is quite significant.
The soil of the American area is poor.
"Both the north German plain and the south
German plateau are basically great glacial deposits
of gravel and sand. Only where alluvium has been
locally deposited by ancient river channels, or
loess soils spread by wind and w ter action, is land
capable of normal yields 'without intensive application
of natural and chemical fertilizers."
Without added quantities of nitrogen, phosphate, ana potash,
there is no hope of an abundant harvest. The existing capacity
for the manufacture of nitrogen and phosphate remained below
estimated requirements in spite of the measures taken during
.1945 and 1946. The result was that the zone had at its dis-
posal twenty-five per cent of the needed nitrogen, ti o per-
cent of the needed phophate end forty-four per cent o^ the
needed potash. The lack of fuel, electric energy, labor and
transportation prevented adequate supplies from coming through.
The great influx of displaced persons and war refugees
caused the copulation to rise from 13,690,000 in 1939 to about
17,900,000. This means that there are more than four hundred
people per square mile. Such an increase has put a greater
burden on an already impoverished zone. Moreover, these
people are not trained for the particular industries of the
three Land, nor ?re they useful on the farms. Tils has caused
a high welfare group and at the same time a large labor
shortage
.
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During the first few months of occupation, rationing was
handled at e Land level. This resulted in varying food rations
throughout the zones. The first step in creating a more even
distribution was to raise rationing to a zonal level. By Jan-
uary 1946, rations had risen from a rate of 360 calories per
day (June 1945) to 1,550 calories per day. This is a bare
subsistence level, hut it did provide for a minimum diet.
During the late spring of 1946, it was impossible to
maintain this Level. A ooor harvest ulus a severe winter
forced the American authorities to cut the rations to 1,275
lories per day in April and in May to 1,130 calories per
day. By July food distribution was almost impossible, Har-
vesting was disorganized due to the shortage of labor, lack
of tools and essential farm supplies. Fertilizer and seeds
were scarce. This breakdown resulted in a reorganization of
economic offices. German agencies were restored at Land,
Kreis, and Gemeinde _evels. A Good and Agriculture Ad-
ministration was established in each of the three Laender.
Under the Food Division the problem of overall administration
for controls on production, delivery, marketing, processing
,
storage and distribution of food to the ultimate consumer and
allocation of agriculture and processing supplies to producers
is taken care of. It also directs county end city district
ration offices, food collection and delivery quotas from
'.
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farmers. The Agricultural Department supervises agricultural
schools and farm organizations and takes care of land devel-
opment and resettlement.
In an attempt to prevent any further cut in rations, every
piece of available land was cultivated. A greater portion of
direct food crops were plant . t the expense of feed and
fodder crops.
Today the Byrnes-Bevin Agreement calls for a minimum,
ration level of 1,800 calories per day for the ordinary con-
sumer and higher rations for work groups. Such a level would
mean the import of at least 5,000,000 tons of food at a cost
of over 800,000,000 dollars to the U.S. and U.K. This is im-
possible at the present time because of both the limited world
food supplies and the cost.
Turning to the industrial picture, the U.S. government
soon recognized that raw materials would have to be sent Into
the zone in order to avoid riots and unemployment. The
Commodity Credit Cooperation was given the task of handling
these imports. Our aim was to send to Germany only enough
materials to prevent disease and unrest. No materials were
to be sent which could be used in heavy war industries or in
industries which were listed for the Allied Reparations account
In December 1945, £31 textile factories were authorized to
begin operation.
-.
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However, this aid did not prove to be enough. Since
nothing had been done to treat Germany as an economic whole,
the U.S. was forced to pour more money into their zone. Un-
official estimates put the sum at 20,000,000 dollars a year.
Zonal trade barriers prevented adequate allocations of
basic raw materials such as coal, iron, steel, lumber and cotton.
With the high percentage of small farms in the zone there was
a great need for hand tools and in order to oroduce these tools
steel was needed. There was a shortage of trucks for deliv-
ering food to urban areas. Even if we had been able to obtain
trucks, transportation would have been difficult because of
the lack of tires, gasoline and oil.
Industry had survived the winter of 1945-1946 but it began
to fail in the late spring and summer of 1946. Throughout
1945, factories had operated on the stockpiles which they held
in reserve. Production rose from two per cent of existing
capacity in 1945 to ten per cent by 1946. However, short-
comings were becoming more noticeable. A mild winter, no
serious epidemics, improvement in coal output in the Ruhr (i.e.
until February when the British had to cut rations thus causing
a serious cut in coal output) and ability to keep up the ration
standard kept our industry going through the winter, but by
May all the fundamental deficiencies of our industrial economy
were becoming impossible to handle without cooperation from the
other zones.
-. .
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CHAPTER VI
BIZONIA
The March Level of Industry plan did not bring the
hoped for economic cooperation. The four powers were not able
to establish a central administrative agency for finance,
industry, foreign trade, transport and communications. Each
nation worked under the policy which it thougnt best. The
result was a lack of raw materials, loss of confidence in the
currency, and a lack of sufficient food. The U.S. zone,
stagnating under these conditions, took up tne demand for a
central economic administration. There seemed to be no pros-
pect of breaking the stalemate. The only solution seemed to
be in a substitute for the Potsdam Agreement.
At the Paris Conference (June 1946) tne U.S. oacxed by
Britain suggested that Germany be Dronen into a dozen loosely
joined states. These would form a political and economic
federation. Secretary Byrnes asked for a four power, twenty-
five year treaty to keep Germany disarmed. Protest was
registered by Russia and Prance. Russia was interested in
incorporating the easier zone into Russian economy and Prance
would not agree until the Allies permitted her to annex the
Saar, dominate the Rhineland and internationalize the Ruhr.
The complete breakdown of any agreement on Germany led
the U.S. to offer to unite economically with any of the other
zones. This of course was directed at Britain, since agree-
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raent with Prance and the U.S.S.R. was impossible at the time.
Foreign Minister Bevin accepted the proposal and plans were
begun to bring the two zones into economic unit., . They felt
that if the Potsdam Agreement could not be carried out and
Germany treated as an economic wnole, that the British would
feel compelled to unite their zone with the American in order
to lessen the burden of the British taxpayer.
On August 1, 1946, the United States plan for zonal merger
with Britain was announced. It consisted of setting up
central German agencies for finance, trade (foreign), trans-
portation, communications and industry. The finance committee
would supervise central agencies' budgets, operate a central
treasury, administer public debt, take care of currency
issuance and Laender banks and attempt to increase imports and
exi)orts. In order to carry out tnese functions, the following
three sub-divisions were to be created; 1) planning and re-
search, g) operations and control, 3) personnel and liaison.
It was felt tnet the merger would take about six montns
before it could be ready to be put into operation. All poli-
cies wrere to be worked out first. Since the British had not
put responsibility into the hands of the German people, this
step would be necessary before a merger could be completed.
A comparison of the tr; de among the three zones for the
month of April will show that tutis tendency for bizonal merger
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was not surprising. The American zone had imported from the
British zone 14,400,000 marks worth of goods and had exported
into that area 19,600,000 marks worth. Into the Russian zone
we had sent supplies worth 1,600,000 and had imported a supply
worth 1,800,000 marks. To the French zone we had sent
10,600,000 marks worth of O oods and had in return imported
goods amounting to 5,600,000 marks.
In September 1946, more British-American plans hecame
known
.
Resources were to he pooled except for those already
subject to four power allocation agreements. There was to he
a joint policy for exports and imports. An executive com-
mittee consisting of the three Economic Ministers from the
American states and three men appointed by the British issue
directives regarding planning and control of production and
distribution, foreign and internal trade, prices and economic
law. They work in close cooperation with the Joint Finance
Committee. The two countries also agreed that a common stan-
dard of living should be established. Food rationing would
rise to provide 1,550 calories per day throughout both zones.
Joint help began at tnis time. The British agreed to
furnish 5,000 extra tons of motor fuel per month and in re-
turn the U.S. zone vrould provide Army trucks, tires and tubes.
The Military Governors of both zones began work on a
five year plan for exports and imports for the combined zones.
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They announced that the economic unification snould rnaxe
western Germany self-sufficient within three years at a cost
of one "billion dollars. This cost would be borne equa.lly by
the two countries.
The pact was finally signed on December 2, 1946 amid
loud protestations from both France and Russia that the Pots-
dam Agreement had been violated. This accusation was of
course expected but uncalled for since both countries had been
invited into the merger; in fact the merger was still open to
them if they cared to join.
The loose unification of the British and American zones
worked fairly well throughout 1947, but many oostacles arose
over the fact that there was no central bank, that currency
needed reforming, that much of the work done in one zone was
oeing duplicated in the other, end that the costs of running
Bizonia, (800,000,000 dollars for 194?) were too great a burden
on Britain. As early as October 8, 1947, the Americans real-
ized that they would have to assume the greater financial
expense of running Bizonia. The British in return were willing
to make available 70,000,000 dollars in supplies from sterling
areas where dollars are not needed to purchase goods. They
also agreed to set aside more ships for carrying supplies from
America to Germany.
Final £greement on a new Bizonia charter was announced in
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February 1948. This charter goes very far toward giving the
American and British zones an unofficial, government. It con-
sists of a Parliament with a.n upper and a lower house, a. cab-
inet, or executive branch, a judiciary with a police force,
and a central bank for all the Laender.
The upper house is called the Laenderrat and is made up
of 16 members, two from each of the eight states of Bizonia.
It has a veto power on all legislation of the lower house but
its veto can be overriden by an absolute majority of the lower
house. Each of the eight minis ter-presidents serves as a
representative in this chamber. Dr. Hans Ehard, Minister-
President of Bavaria, and a C.D.U. pa.rty member was elected
chairman of this body
.
The lower nouse, known as the Economic Council, formerly
had fifty-four members, but the number has now been raised to
one hundred and four. They are elected democratically on the
basis of proportional representation. The Economic Council
can pass legislation on economic matters and can initiate
taxation. Dr. Erich Koehler, president of the Economic Council
in its former structure, was voted to continue in this capa-
city. He is a member of the C.D.U. which controls the lower
house at the present time.
The Executive Committee or Cabinet is composed of the
directors of the six bizonal agencies already mentioned. A
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minister without portfolio, elected by the Economic Council
with the approval of the Laenderrat, presides over the
Cabinet. A vote of non-confidence, confirmed by the Laend-
errat and the American- British Bipartite board, can force the
Cabinet to resign.
The judiciary is made up of German judges whose duty it
is to work in close conjunction with the newly established
police force in an attempt to force each of the Lend to de-
liver the food and other supplies required by the Economic
Council. Under the old Bizonia goverment, it was an easy
matter for a Land to avoid fulfilling its required quota. It
is hoped that an effective police force and judiciary will
overcome this difficulty.
Perhaps the greatest accomplishment of the new Bizonial
government was the es tablishment of a central bank. This was
necessary before any currency reform could be made. The new
bank, modeled after the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, works only
with the central banks of the Laender. It has tne sole right
to issue notes and coins, subject to Allied direction. It is
run by a board of directors and a board of managers. The
board of directors is made up of the presidents of various
central banks in the individual states. Its president holds
his position for a three year term. The new bank will have
dealings with member state banks for the purchase and sale
of foreign exchange and gold. It has the power to "issue
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
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directives for the general regulation of bank credit including
interest and discount rates, and the open market operations
19
of the member Land Central Banks."
Following the establishment of the Central State Bank of
Bizonia, British and U.S. Military Government authorities put
through a new currency for foreign commerce. They established
a thirty cent Reichsmark for all foreign trade except food
imports and coal exports. The directive announcing this
change stated that "Further isolation of German internal
prices from the world market costs of imported goods must be
terminated by relating tneir internal selling prices to world
prices at a uniform conversion factor, a step which will not
involve any significant change in the cost of living nor
necessitate cnrnges in wages." before this reform much
confusion had resulted in converting Reichsmarks into foreign
exchange. For example, coal sold in Germany for fifteen marks
a ton and brought fifteen dollars a ton outside of Germany.
But cameras sold abroad gave the Reichsmark a value of only
forty cents. The new thirty cent Reichsmark does away with
thid discrepancy in foreign excnange.
These recent changes in Bizonia have brought into exist-
ence a government which seems to act in an almost political
capacity. It seems to be only a matter of waiting until such
recognition, is officially given.
19. Christian Science Mon i t o r March S
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The greatest problem of Bizonia is coal, a necessity for
west German economy. Coal is needed not Only for export, but
for all German industry. The great center of German coal lies
in the British zone, which before the war supplied almost
seventy-five percent of Germany’s hard coal and forty per cent
of her lignite or brown coal. When the war ended, these mines
of the Ruhr valley were in a very poor condition. The mach-
inery was old and badly in need of repairs. Wooden piles,
needed in the mines, were unobtainable. Added to this was the
increased shortage of labor. Many of the youth who would have
worked in these mines, had been taken into the German army.
The older men 1 ere no longer capable of producing the same
quantities of coal. Because of the extremely low food rations
there was a great deal of sickness in the Runr area, and this
meant absenteeism from the mines. Thus when the British took
over the Ruhr in 1945 the mines were producing about fifteen
per cent of their normal output. One-half of this output was
needed to run the mines. In order to raise production, the
British were forced to bring in 100,000 new workers. They
put the miners on an incentive plan, giving them rations nearly
three times larger than those of the ordinary consumer. The
result was a gratifying increase in coal production. The
following tables indicate the increase in coal output since
the end of the war.
••
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July 1945 50,000
March 1947 230,000
April 1947 250,000
June 1947 218,000
July 1947 225,000
August 194 7 257,000
September 1947 241,000
October 1947 244,000
November 1947 280,000
January 1948 280,000
21
It will be noted that coal production fell off consid-
erably between April 1947 and July 1947. The March 1947 food
crisis caused absenteeism in the mines. Pood rations had
been cut in the British zones to a below subsistence level
and workers took time off to go into the country in search of
black market food. In July 1947, the American and British
authorities, in an attempt to stop this practice, put through
a second incentive plan. Each miner producing a given amount
of coal per week was given extra food and tobacco. The miners
were also given snares in the proceeds of coal exports. With
this stimulus, miners have increased the coal output steadily
until the present time, when it has tended to level off. It
is unlikely that coal production will increase any more unless
more labor can be found and greater rations given to the
miners
•
21 • Christian Science Monitor Jan 8, 1948
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Germany today is the sick man of Europe. In the three
years of Allied occupation, very little has been accomplished
in turning the German away from his old ideals of nationalism
and power. Twice defeated, the Germans of today feel just as
strongly as before that they are a superior race and that
their destiny does not lie in serving their conquerors. Youth
movements similar to those of Hitler days are springing up.
Although such organizations are outlawed by the Allied Author-
ities, they do exist. These Youth organizations are filled
with young men who served under Hitler and remember the time
when they had plenty to eat and were well dressed; they remem-
ber that they were proud of their uniforms and proud of their
country. Today thef e men see only destruction around them.
The hopes of a better life seem impossible and so they natur-
ally look back on the past when they were the favorite children
of the Reich. With these remembrances, they turn to the future
with the conviction that in order to take Germany out of her
present situation, they must be rid of the Allies and rebuild
a Reich based on the traditional German ideals of Bismarck,
Wilhelm II and Hitler. They fail to see that the distress
around them was brought about by these men. They blame
democracy instead. I do not mean to infer that Hitler is still
regarded as a savior but that the sentiments which led the
people to him remain although he has gone.
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"Adolf Hitler is dead and almost forgotten oy
the students, out militarism and pan-Germanism
are not. Young men, many of whom still wear
worn hits of army uniforms, talk excitedly of
a revival of Germany and of a "soldier’s party"
that will wrest political ^gadership from the
old men who now hold it."
By the ’old men’ they mean those political leaders who
have tried to cooperate with the Allies. They regard those
who are friendly to American effort as ’quislings".
It is not unnatural for the youth of Germany to feel
this way. They cannot understand that we are seeking to
rebuild a Germany which will he a peaceful nation and do not
intend to enslave her. But how can they understand this when
they have been brought up under the theory that "to the victor
belongs the spoils"?
We have tried to lessen this feeling of hatred and dis-
trust. At the same time, we have tried to point out that it
is due to their own behavior that Germany is in this chaotic
state. We have attempted to denazify the schools and political
institutions. This is a difficult task. In the schools many
of the teachers who wo^.ld he suitable, have left Germany or
been killed in Nazi concentration eamps. Since this leaves
a, great shortage of teachers, we have been forced to screen
out the strongest Nazis and allow the lesser men to teach-
in the schools and universities.
In politics, men of the Nazi party a.re not allowed to
22 . Joes ten, Joachim, Germany: wKeITNow? pg. 281
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vote, run for office or belong to a political party. However,
it is impossible to seeK out each Nazi affiliated person and
so we often find that we are working with men who have been
strong Nazis. Friedrich Schaeffer, one time minister-presi-
dent of Bavaria, provides an excellent example of now greatly
we can blunder.
It is also difficult to prevent underground movements.
Men, disqualified from taking an active part in olitics, can
easily speak out against the military government. They can
talk to friends and spread about a doctrine which is contrary
to the ideals wrhich we are trying to instill in the Germans.
It caught they are punished of course, but it takes a tre-
mendous police force to ferret out such peo le end we do not
neve the manpower to carry on such activities.
Our three years occupation as not ccirvinced the German
that democracy can work in their country. Perhaps in ten or
fifteen years, their attituo.es will be different, but it can
hardly be expected that their sentiments can be directed
toward democracy when their stomachs are empty; when they
see American troops who are w7ell fed and enjoying comforts
which they are deprived of; or when they see their nation
being divided into two parts by victorious conquerors. The
task of winning a defeated people over to the views of the
victors is difficult enough in itself. Complicated with
..
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strife among the victors, economic chaos, and destruction on
all sides, it becomes almost impossible. I say almost im-
possible because I tiiink that a solution could and must be
found if we do not want another Germain war on our hands.
Any solution must, I trank, rest on two prerequisites,
l) that German industry and agriculture insure a subsistence
level for all Germans. 2) that education in the schools and
universities be truly democratic. We have endeavored to
accomplish just this. So far, we have not been gre? tly
successful, but when we consider that the American zone has
never been a self-sufficient area and when we understand that
the universities there were little damaged during the war so
that the average student in them today is not reminded that
Hitler’s war nearly cost them their education, then it seems
that we have not failed but nave only started in the long
task of turning the German toward democracy and peace.
But the greatest problem in Germany today does not rest
in our treatment of the American zone. It springs from the
initial mistake of the Allies in dividing Germany into four
zones of occupation. It seems incredible that our leaders
could believe that there could be economic unity in a nation
when there is no political unity. Today there is little
chance of separating one from the other. They are so entwined
that no government can exist which doesn’t take into account
( :
*
«
l
•
*
(
t
.
.
.
*
V.
.
60
both factors. Yet we believed that we could work together
in German econoray and separately in politics. What a naive
point of view. When we add to this the fact that each of
the big four has a political structure which is part of their
economic structure, then the picture becomes more ridiculous.
Did the Allies, one of whom has an economy which is totally
sta.te controlled, another who has an only partially national
-
ized sta.te, and a third who stands for free enterprize, think
they could work out an economic solution for Germany without
first working out a political structure? This first error
merely postponed the day when they were forced to realize that
they had no real solution for Germany.
Today, Germany is being used as a political football
among the Allies. This is an advantageous situation for the
German people for they can play one side against the other,
accepting tha.t nation which has the most to offer. Such a
position actually gives Germany the upper hand in demanding
any terms which she might want. She can use this position
in either a political or economic sense, for she is able to
use the threat of 'going over to the otuer side'.
Ideally the solution for Germany would rest on four power
agreement. Practically, this seems impossible. Each confer-
ence has led us farther and f rther away from agreement. The
only alternative seems to be in permitting Germany to remain
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divided. Already the separation of Germany into an eastern
and western zone is a’fait accompli’. The new Bizonial govern-
ment only needs an announcement of the fact that it is a
political entity to convert it from an economic merger into
a seps.rs.te Germany.
"•That then remains to he done? First, we must he pre-
pared to comhat the irredentist movements whieh are hound to
arise. This division of Germany is most unpleasant to the
Germe.n people and they will naturally do all they can to bring
about a single nation. To change their attitudes will he
difficult hut it could he done through propaganda, education
and e. sts.hle economy.
Our chances of success in this venture are small, hut
it is the only path left open to us. America, has already
chosen the way, now it must pour resources, and perhaps even
troops into Germany to carry out its choice.
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GERMAIjY of today

POTSDAM AGREEMENT
Released August 2, 1945
III. Germany
The Political and Economic Principles To Govern the
Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period
A. Political Principles
1. In accordance with the agreement on control mach-
inery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exer-
cised, on instructions from their respective governments,
by the Commanders- in-Chief of the armed forces of the
United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each
in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters
affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members
of the Control Council.
2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity
of treatment of the German popul; tion throughout Germany.
8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accord-
ance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law,
and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of
race, nationality or religion.
9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be
directed towards the decentralization of the political f; tr /
structure and the development of local responsibility. To
this end:
(i) Local self-government shall be restored throughout
Germany on democratic principles and in particular through
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elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military
security and the purposes of military occupation;
(ii) All democratic political parties with rights of
assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and en-
couraged throughout Germany;
(iii) Representative and elective principles shall be
introduced into regional, provincial and state (land) ad-
ministration as rapidly as may be justified by the success-
ful application of these principles in local self-govern-
ment ;
(iv) For the time being no central German government
shall be established, Notwithstanding this, however, cer-
tain essential central German administrative departments,
headed by state secretaries, shall be established, partic-
ularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications,
foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act
under the direction of the Control Council.
B. Economic Principles.
11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential,
the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as
well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be
prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals,
machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a
war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to
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Germany’s approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the ob-
jectives stated in paragraph 15. Productive capacity not
needed for permitted production shall be removed in accord-
ance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied
Commission on reparations and approved by the governments
concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.
12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy
shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the
present excessive concentration of economic power as exempli-
fied in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other
monopolistic arrangements.
13. In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis
shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful
domestic industries.
14. During the period of occupation Germany sha.ll be
treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies
shall be established in regard to:
(a) Mining and industrial production and allocations;
(b) Agriculture, forestry and fishing;
(c) Wages, prices and rationing;
(d) Import and export programs for Germany as a. whole;
(e) Currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
(g) Transportation and communications.
15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German
economy but only to the extent necessary:
.-
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^a) To carry out programs of industrial disarmament and
demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports end
imports
.
(b) To assure the production and maintenance of goods and
services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces
and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in
Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of
of the standards of living of European countries. (European
countries means all European countries excluding the United
Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)
(c) To ensure in the manner determined by the Control
Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities
between the several zones so as to produce a balanced econ-
omy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.
(d) To control German industry and all economic and
financial international transactions, including exports and
imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing
a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named
herein.
(e) To control all German public or private scientific
bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories,
et cetera, connected with economic activities.
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